Rational Probabilistic Deciders—Part II: Collective Behavior

P. T. Kabamba, W.-C. Lin and S. M. Meerkov

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2007, vol. 2007, 1-34

Abstract:

This paper explores the behavior of rational probabilistic deciders (RPDs) in three types of collectives: zero sum matrix games, fractional interactions, and Edgeworth exchange economies. The properties of steady states and transients are analyzed as a function of the level of rationality, N , and, in some cases, the size of the collective, M . It is shown that collectives of RPDs, may or may not behave rationally, depending, for instance, on the relationship between N and M (under fractional interactions) or N and the minimum amount of product exchange (in Edgeworth economies). The results obtained can be useful for designing rational reconfigurable systems that can autonomously adapt to changing environments.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:082184

DOI: 10.1155/2007/82184

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