Punishment and Feedback Mechanism for the Evolution Game on Small-World Network Based on Varying Topology

Yuntao Shi, Bo Liu, Xiaoliang Kou and Xiao Han

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2014, vol. 2014, 1-6

Abstract:

We address the problem of the punishment and feedback mechanism for the evolution game on small-world network with varying topology. Based on the strategy updating rule, we propose a new punishment and feedback mechanism; that is, all the individuals of the network will play an -round Prisoner’s Dilemma Game firstly and then, for the most defectors, their neighbors will punish them and break the connecting link with them and set up the new connecting link for themselves. The mechanism can make the degree of the whole network decrease. We find that the mechanism can help keep the cooperators surviving and make them avoid being wiped out by the defectors. With the mechanism being adopted, the number of -round Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) almost has no effect on the evolution game. Furthermore, the probability of the average connecting and the scale of the network is related to the result of the evolution game.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:148915

DOI: 10.1155/2014/148915

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