Decentralized Supply Chains under Random Price-Dependent Demand: Noncooperative Equilibria vs. Coordination with Cost-Sharing Contracts

Yanpeng Sun, Cheng Ma and Qi Sun

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2020, vol. 2020, 1-15

Abstract:

It is common for a supplier to sell products to multiple retailers. In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of a decentralized supply chain with multiple retailers facing a random price-dependent demand in the additive form. Here, we consider two kinds of demand functions: the distribution of the demand depends only on the retailer’s own retail price (noncompeting retailers) and not only on his own retail price but also on that of the other retailers (competing retailers). We present appropriate wholesale price, buy-back, and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts to coordinate the total supply chain, so that when all the retailers adopt their equilibrium response, the supply chain system coordination is also achieved. Furthermore, the coalition formation among retailers is also analyzed. We find that with buy-back and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts and linear price-dependent demand function, retailers always prefer being in the grand coalition to forming any other coalition.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:1920797

DOI: 10.1155/2020/1920797

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