Governance Mechanism for Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Stochastic Differential Game Approach

Wei Yu and Baogui Xin

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2013, vol. 2013, 1-13

Abstract:

Today developed and developing countries have to admit the fact that global warming is affecting the earth, but the fundamental problem of how to divide up necessary greenhouse gas reductions between developed and developing countries remains. In this paper, we propose cooperative and noncooperative stochastic differential game models to describe greenhouse gas emissions decision makings of developed and developing countries, calculate their feedback Nash equilibrium and the Pareto optimal solution, characterize parameter spaces that developed and developing countries can cooperate, design cooperative conditions under which participants buy the cooperative payoff, and distribute the cooperative payoff with Nash bargaining solution. Lastly, numerical simulations are employed to illustrate the above results.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/MPE/2013/312585.pdf (application/pdf)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/MPE/2013/312585.xml (text/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:312585

DOI: 10.1155/2013/312585

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Mathematical Problems in Engineering from Hindawi
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mohamed Abdelhakeem ().