A Game of Two Elderly Care Facilities: Competition, Mothballing Options, and Policy Implications

Congcong Wang, Yingxue Zhao and Rongda Chen

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2016, vol. 2016, 1-12

Abstract:

This article develops a model to investigate the entry strategies of private investors to the elderly care service market, with the purpose of explaining the reasons behind dilemma of low signing rate plaguing China’s Public-Private Partnership projects. We focus on the competition between two private investors with or without mothballing options under price uncertainty. After the derivation of equilibria of entry strategies, we employ numerical examples to analyze the dependencies of entry thresholds on market parameters, cost parameters, subsidy, and possession of mothballing option. Conclusions are drawn and some policy implications are given with the intention to alleviate the problem of low signing rate.

Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:3241973

DOI: 10.1155/2016/3241973

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