Tristage Bargaining Dynamic Game-Based Preventive Maintenance for Electric Multiple Unit

Lü Xiong, Hong Wang and Zuhua Jiang

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2020, vol. 2020, 1-10

Abstract:

The operation and maintenance sectors of electric multiple unit (EMU) are considered as game participants to optimize the preventive maintenance (PM) schedule of EMU components. The total cost of a component over a life cycle includes failure risk and maintenance cost. The failure risk of EMU components is assessed quantitatively by using an analytic hierarchy process and scoring and weighting the factors that affect the failure risk of such components. The operation sector expects failure risk to be minimized, whereas the maintenance sector expects maintenance costs to be low, and their interests interfere with each other to some extent. This study establishes a tristage bargaining dynamic game model of the operation sector priority bid and maintenance sector priority bid considering the PM reliability threshold R as the bargaining object. A numerical example demonstrates that the result is more beneficial to the sector that bids first, and the operation priority bid allows the component to maintain a higher reliability level over a life cycle, especially in the latter half of the component life cycle.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:3832123

DOI: 10.1155/2020/3832123

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