Incentive Contract Design considering Fairness Preferences and Carbon Emission Reduction Multiobjective Tasks

Zhipeng Li, Shuzhen Zhu and Xinyu Cao

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2021, vol. 2021, 1-11

Abstract:

Considering the multitargets of corporate carbon emission reduction and the fairness preference psychology of the company, a government incentive model for corporate carbon emission reduction was constructed. The impact of corporate fairness preferences on government carbon emission reduction incentive strategies is studied. In addition, numerical simulation is used to analyze the impact of changes in correlation coefficients, fairness preference coefficients, and discount rates on the optimal enterprise effort coefficient and the government optimal incentive coefficient. Research shows that the degree of fairness preference of a company has a direct impact on the degree of corporate effort, while the discount rate will only have an impact on the company’s long-term effort. In order to improve corporate carbon emission reduction efforts, the government must not only consider the impact of fairness preference on corporate efforts but also flexibly adjust the incentive coefficient of long-term and short-term tasks based on the discount rate.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/MPE/2021/6541682.pdf (application/pdf)
http://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/MPE/2021/6541682.xml (text/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:6541682

DOI: 10.1155/2021/6541682

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Mathematical Problems in Engineering from Hindawi
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mohamed Abdelhakeem ().