A Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution between Two Asymmetric Nations

Yongxi Yi, Rongwei Xu and Sheng Zhang

Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2017, vol. 2017, 1-10

Abstract:

Considering the fact that transboundary pollution control calls for the cooperation between interested parties, this paper studies a cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric nations in infinite-horizon level. In this paper, we model two ways of transboundary pollution: one is an accumulative global pollutant with an uncertain evolutionary dynamic and the other is a regional nonaccumulative pollutant. In our model, firms and governments are separated entities and they play a Stackelberg game, while the governments of the two nations can cooperate in pollution reduction. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of governments and industrial firms, and it is found that the governments being cooperative in transboundary pollution control will set a higher pollution tax rate and make more pollution abatement effort than when they are noncooperative. Additionally, a payment distribution mechanism that supports the subgame consistent solution is proposed.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hin:jnlmpe:9492582

DOI: 10.1155/2017/9492582

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