メインバンク・ガバナンスと「追い貸し」, Main-Bank Governance and Ever-Green Lending

Seki Obata and Koji Sakai

Economic Review, 2005, vol. 56, issue 2, 149-161

Abstract: いわゆる「追い貸し」について，本稿では，明らかに非効率的な融資と思われる「追い貸し」に絞って分析を行い，メインバンクが「追い貸し」を行う要因の解明を試みた．結果は，メインバンクの経営危機に陥った企業に対する融資額が大きい場合には「追い貸し」を行う可能性が高く，メインバンクの財務的な状況は関係がなく， また，安定的なメインバンク関係は「追い貸し」につながるわけではなく，むしろ，メイン争いを複数の銀行が行った場合において，「追い貸し」が起こる，というものであった．, This paper analyzes so-called "Ever-Green Lending". We try to analyze the very limited situation of firms compared with other research dealing with ever-green lending. We focus on the Main Bank's lending behavior to obviously economically distressed firms which were abandoned by banks other than the Main-Bank. Our result shows that the Main-Bank extends loan to distressed clients if the main-bank loan size to the firm is large. However, Keiretsu relationships, which are popular among earlier researchers on the Japanese Main Bank, are not relevant. Furthermore, a stable main-bank relationship does not bring the ever-green loan to the firm, rather, competition among banks for the main-bank status in the past does.

Date: 2005
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