The Jury Theorem and Justifications of the Majority Vote

Toyotaka Sakai

Economic Review, 2016, vol. 67, issue 2, 125-133

Abstract: This paper is an introductory article on the normative basis of the use of the majority vote in society. Our central question is when and why the minority should obey the will of the majority under a majority vote. Our argument is based on Condorcet's jury theorem and Rousseau's Social Contract. Justifications that are not based on the jury theorem are also discussed.

JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:ecorev:v:67:y:2016:i:2:p:125-133

DOI: 10.15057/27899

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