Analyzing Coalition Formation of a Patent Pool Using a Bargaining Model

Makoto Kadowaki

Economic Review, 2018, vol. 69, issue 3, 193-205

Abstract: In a technology market, either multiple-patent pools are typically formed or dedicated outsiders form a patent pool. Regarding this, my paper analyzes the coalition formation of a patent pool under the general assumption of the complementarity of patents and examines how patent pools affect a firmʼs profit and social welfare. The paper shows that a patent holderʼs grand coalition cannot be formed when its complementarity is beyond a certain threshold. Therefore the tragedy of the anti-commons（one of the multi-marginalization problems）occurs in a technology market, i.e., patent holders always set excessively high prices above the patent costs compared to a joint-profit maximizing level. This causes the under-use of patent technology and loss of consumer surplus and social welfare.

JEL-codes: D43 K39 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/29368/keizaikenkyu06903193.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:ecorev:v:69:y:2018:i:3:p:193-205

DOI: 10.15057/29368

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economic Review from Hitotsubashi University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library ().