Upstream Competition and Exclusive Content Provision in Media Markets

Kiho Yoon

Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 2025, vol. 66, issue 2, 61-92

Abstract: With a multilateral vertical contracting model of media markets, we examine upstream competition and contractual arrangements in content provision. We analyze the trade of content by the Nash bargaining solution and the downstream competition by the Hotelling location model. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes and the contractual arrangements for various vertical structures. We show that the possibility of exclusive contracts rises when the value of the premium content increases, the degree of horizontal differentiation in the downstream market decreases, the importance of advertising revenue decreases, and the relative bargaining power of upstream firm decreases.

Keywords: exclusive contract; vertical contracting; Nash bargaining; video programming; online video distributors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L42 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hit-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2061561/files/HJeco0660200610.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hitjec:v:66:y:2025:i:2:p:61-92

DOI: 10.15057/hje.2025004

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics from Hitotsubashi University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library ().