Social Norms, Moral Commitment, and Cooperation

Alexander Kritikos and Georg Meran

Homo Oeconomicus, 1998, vol. 15, 71-92

Abstract: Normative Game theory does not consider cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) as a serious strategy. Recent research has, therefore, introduced nonmonetary values to explain why individuals may choose to cooperate in PD-Games. It is not explained, however, where the values come from. Under the assumption of endogenous preferences we show that educating individuals towards a moral commitment can change preferences in a way that a deliberate willingness for cooperation is created. For that we provide a utility function where the compliance to social norms generates utility. Accordingly, we regard the decisions of morally committed individuals as rational.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1998:p:71-92

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