New Directions in Experimental Coordiantion Games

Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Karl-Martin Erhart and Claudia Keser
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Siegfried K. Berninghaus: Institute for Statistics and Mathematical Economics, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe Germany
Karl-Martin Erhart: Institute for Statistics and Mathematical Economics, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe Germany
Claudia Keser: Institute for Statistics and Mathematical Economics, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe Germany

Homo Oeconomicus, 1998, vol. 15, 93-106

Abstract: Recent experimental results show that equilibrium selection in coordination games exhibits remarkable regularities. We analyze three important determinants for equilibrium selection in coordination games, the size of the population of players, the number of periods during which players interact and the local interaction structure imposed on the population of players.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1998:p:93-106

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