The Value of Coalition Power

Manfred J.Holler and Mika Widgrén
Additional contact information
Manfred J.Holler: Institute of Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

Homo Oeconomicus, 1999, vol. 15, 497-511

Abstract: The message of this paper is that value of a coalition is power. This coincides with the view that coalitions do not have preferences, but merely represent the preferences of their members. Implications are discussed with the respect to (a) the hypothesis that power indices cannot explain decisionmaking in the European Union because they do not take into consideration the preferences of the member countries and (b) the fitness concept of evolutionary game theory and the identity of fitness and power. After a presentation of selected power indices, the question is discussed as to whether these measures express expectations or whether they conceptualize power. A corresponding re-interpretation of the (non-)monotonicity of power measures concludes the paper.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1999:p:497-511

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Homo Oeconomicus from Institute of SocioEconomics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().