Voting and Voting Power in the Stability Pact

Matthias Stutter
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Matthias Stutter: University of Innsbruck, Institute of Public Finance, Innsbruck, Austria

Homo Oeconomicus, 1999, vol. 15, 521-542

Abstract: This paper analyses the distribution of voting power in the excessive deficit procedure as clarified by the stability pact. The main results are that large countries can exert more power to avoid being fined when having an excessive deficit than smaller countries and that the voting procedure favours countries opposed to sanctioning excessive deficits. Bloc formation pays off for members of a bloc, especially when the vote is on monetary sanctions. The effects of bloc formation on single players' voting power show no systematic bias in favour of certain countries. An already existing bloc can gain power by the formation of an additional bloc.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:15:y:1999:p:521-542

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