Power in Game Forms

Nicholas R. Mille
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Nicholas R. Mille: Department of Political Science, University of Maryland, Baltimore, USA

Homo Oeconomicus, 1999, vol. 16, 219-243

Abstract: This essay defines power in game forms in what I believe to be a plausible and natural manner. It distinguishes between the affirmative and preclusive "faces" of power and identifies general properties that characterize all power relations (and all game forms). It also identifies certain special properties that may characterize some power relations (and some game forms). It defines "effective" preference in a manner similar to "domination" in the sense of cooperative game theory. And finally it asks this question: what conditions on power relations assure that, even as preferences may change, effective preference has "nice" properties such that society can make collective decisions easily. The answer is this: if there are three or more possible outcomes, and if no actor has all the power, it is impossible to structure power in such a way that effective preference has "nice" properties.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:16:y:1999:p:219-243

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