Scandals and Evolution: A Theory of Social Revolution

Manfred J. Holler and Ralf Peters
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Manfred J. Holler: Institute of Socioeconomics, University of Hamburg
Ralf Peters: Institute of Socioeconomics, University of Hamburg

Homo Oeconomicus, 1999, vol. 16, 75-92

Abstract: In this paper, scandals are considered as social mutants: they challenge the equilibrium status quo of a society that is embodied in its value system and its institutions. After a brief discussion of Ken Binmore's evolutionary theory of a social value equilibrium, we present the basic concepts of the biological and the social model of evolution. The presentation includes a discussion of the stability of the social contract. In the sequel, the social model of evolution is applied to the scandal phenomenon and the social value problem.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:16:y:1999:p:75-92

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