Scandals - the Externality Case

Wolfgang Weigel
Additional contact information
Wolfgang Weigel: Insitute of Economics, University of Vienna, Wien

Homo Oeconomicus, 1999, vol. 16, 93-96

Abstract: Undoubtedly scandals are caused by deviances from an average expected way of conduct. Consequently they are felt to endanger a moral equilibrium, although by the same token the actions underlying the scandal give rise to pleasure as well as rents. Application of standard reasoning thus will lead to the conclusion that there might be too many actions resulting in scandals. However, in the present note it is argued firstly that there is no uniform type of scandal, and secondly that some scandals could even create positive externalities in terms of entertainment for the public. Moreover, the unexpected non-appearance of scandals could cause welfare losses. Therefore, the amount of scandals might fall short of the optimum.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:16:y:1999:p:93-96

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Homo Oeconomicus from Institute of SocioEconomics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().