The Use of Scandals in the Progress of Society

Manfred J. Holler and Bengt-Arne Wickstr÷m
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Manfred J. Holler: Institute of Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
Bengt-Arne Wickstr÷m: Institute of Public Economics, Humboldt-Universitõt zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany

Homo Oeconomicus, 1999, vol. 16, 97-110

Abstract: Social conventions and norms can be modeled as equilibria of coordination games. It is argued that the critical mass necessary for a society to move from one convention, that is from one equilibrium, to another changes correspondingly with changes in the population structure due to generation shifts. A scandal is defined as a breach of the accepted norm by prominent persons. When the critical mass necessary for a change in the accepted convention is sufficiently small, a scandal can trigger off such a change since the scandal maker has a certain number of sympathizers who follow her in breaking the accepted norm. The argument is illustrated by several examples from the history of mankind.

Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:16:y:1999:p:97-110

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