Connected Coalitions, P¾lya Sequences and Voting Power Indices

Sven Berg and Thommy Perlinger
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Sven Berg: Department of Statistics, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden
Thommy Perlinger: Department of Statistics, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden

Homo Oeconomicus, 2000, vol. 16, 391-403

Abstract: We look at the power of players in a voting game in which only certain coalitions are allowed due to, e.g., ideological constraints. Voting on a one-dimensional spectrum is an example. Edelman's (1997) model of voting on a convex set is supplemented with a probability model for generating coalitions. Connected coalitions are generated by means of sequences of binary P¾lya variables. An extended parametrized version of the Shapley-Shubik voting power index is derived.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:16:y:2000:p:391-403

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