Notions of A Priori Voting Power: Critique of Holler and WidgrÚn

Moshé Machover

Homo Oeconomicus, 2000, vol. 16, 415-425

Abstract: These are critical remarks on Holler and WidgrÚn (1999) and in particular on Holler's Public Good Index. The central idea is a distinction between two underlying pre-formal notions of a priori voting power: power as influence over the outcome, and power as expected relative share in a payoff.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:16:y:2000:p:415-425

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