Power, Cooperation Indices and Coalition Structures

Rafel Amer and Francesc Carreras
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Rafel Amer: Department of Applied Mathematics, School of Industrial Engineering of Terrassa, Polytech University of Catalonia, Terrassa, Spain
Francesc Carreras: Department of Applied Mathematics, School of Industrial Engineering of Terrassa, Polytech University of Catalonia, Terrassa, Spain

Homo Oeconomicus, 2000, vol. 17, 11-23

Abstract: We introduce an allocation rule for measuring power in voting situations defined by a TU-game, a cooperation index and a coalition structure, and characterize it axiomatically. This rule is an extension of the Owen coalition value, in fact, a variety of previously studied game situations is embodied an unified by our model. Two numerical examples illustrate the application of the new value.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:17:y:2000:p:11-23

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