Set Games

Harry Aarts, Kees Hoede and Yukihiko Funaki ()
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Harry Aarts: Faculty of Mathematical Sciences, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
Kees Hoede: Faculty of Mathematical Sciences, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands

Homo Oeconomicus, 2000, vol. 17, 137-154

Abstract: In this paper a new type of cooperative games in characteristic function form (called set games) is introduced. In a set game the worth of a coalition is expressed by a set instead of a real number. For this class of games we will define the notion of value, being a solution concept and also several axioms. Furthermore we will study values for set games that satisfy the so-called additivity axiom which is the analog of the additivity axiom for the Shapley value.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:17:y:2000:p:137-154

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