Repeated Game Strategies in Local and Group Prisoner's Dilemmas Experiments: First Results

Oliver Kirchkamp and Rosemarie Nagel

Homo Oeconomicus, 2001, vol. 18, 319-335

Abstract: We investigate and compare different approaches in order to derive strategies from observed data in spatial and spaceless prisoners's dilemmas experiments. WE start with a model where layers choose a fixed action that remains constant for all repetitions of a stage game. As an extension we then allow players to choose simple repeated game strategies that remain fixed over the course of the game, however. We then discuss a method to identify changing repeated game strategies. This method is used to study a simple reinforcement model. We find that in a spatial structure reinforcement plays a more important role than in a spaceless structure

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:319-335

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