Selection Between Pareto-optimal Outcomes in Two-Person Bargaining With and Without the right to Make a Proposal

Bodo Vogt and Wulf Albers
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Bodo Vogt: Institut f³r Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universitõt Bielefeld, Germany
Wulf Albers: Institut f³r Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universitõt Bielefeld, Germany

Homo Oeconomicus, 2001, vol. 18, 77-90

Abstract: The selection between Pareto-optimal outcomes in two-person bargaining with the right to make a proposal and without this right are considered. Concepts for the selection without the right to make a proposal are the Nash criterion, the Kalai-Smorodinsky criterion, the egalitarian solution, the equal-loss solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky criterion modified by prominence aspects. A model for the selection if one player can make an ultimatum proposal is the modified Kalai-Smorodinsky criterion with adapted Bliss point. Experiments using the strategy method were performed to test the predictions of the different models. The results support the modified Kalai-Smorodinsky criteria for the corresponding situations.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:18:y:2001:p:77-90

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