Preferences and Power in the European Union

Madeleinen O. Hoslil
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Madeleinen O. Hoslil: Department of Political Science, Free University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Homo Oeconomicus, 2002, vol. 19, 311-326

Abstract: Voting power analysis as applied to the European Union (EU) has recently come under criticism. Critiques of the technique claim that power indices fail to take actors' preferences into account and usually neglect inter-institutional patterns of decision-making in the union. this article tries to illustrate limitations to this critique, as it appears to be largely overstated, and delineates important characteristics underlying different approaches to analyzing the distribution of power among and within EU institutions. In addition, the article outlines some possible avenues to extend voting power analysis in ways induced by critiques, providing results on analyses when actors in EU institutions are assumed to form connected coalitions rather than any possible coaltion among members

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:19:y:2002:p:311-326

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