Maintaining the Integrity of Standards: No Passage East of Java

Tineke M. Egyedi () and John Hudsoni ()
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Tineke M. Egyedi: Delft University of Technology Faculty of Systems Engineering, Policy Analysis and Management Information and Communications Technology
John Hudsoni: Department of Economics and International Development, University of Bath, Bath, UK
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: John Hudson

Homo Oeconomicus, 2005, vol. 22, 1-20

Abstract: This paper explores how best to protect the integrity of standards. The context is the attempts by Sun to transform Java from a de facto to a de jure standard. We show that where the de facto standard is already in existence, control of the standard's evolution can be optimally placed in the hands of a single firm, possibly the one developing it, provided (i) the firm has no other products the profits of which however indirectly are linked to that standard and (ii) measures, such as the enforcement of non-discriminatory licensing, are taken to prevent the exploitation of a monopoly position. A de jure standard is unlikely to do this because firms take their competitive interests into standards committees. Sun's experience with Java illustrates this. Together with Sun's own reluctance to relinquish control of the standard, it explains the failure, to date, in making Java a de jure standard. Whilst Sun's legal dispute with Microsoft suggests that the law does not place sufficient emphasis on the importance of maintaining a standard's integrity.

Date: 2005
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