Market for Votes

Klaus Kultti () and Hannu Salonen

Homo Oeconomicus, 2005, vol. 23, 323-332

Abstract: We construct a centralised market where agents can trade voting rights. Text book markets do not work but the situation is strategic, and there are many equilibria. In an equilibrium where trading takes place the minimum efficiency gain, i.e. the probability with which an efficient outcome is chosen, is between 12% and 37% depending on the number of voters.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hom:homoec:v:23:y:2005:p:323-332

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