COORDINACIÓN Y BÚSQUEDA DE NORMAS: UN ENFOQUE DESDE LA TEORÍA DE LA ELECCIÓN PÚBLICA

José Casas Pardo (), Juan de Dios Montoro Pons () and José Casas Pardo
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José Casas Pardo: Universidad de Valencia
Juan de Dios Montoro Pons: Universidad de Valencia
José Casas Pardo: Universidad de Valencia

Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, 2001, vol. 159, issue 4

Abstract: The present paper analyzes competitive coordination games from a public choice approach. In these, agents may engage in a rent-seeking competition for norms, which redefines property rights and has redistributive effects. For a binary population, the work shows that rent dissipation will depend on the asymmetry of the payoffs, the returns of the rent-seeking activities and on the population distribution. The main conclusion is that, under plausible conditions, the rent dissipation will not be perfect. Classification-JEL : D72

Keywords: rent-seeking; coordination games; welfare losses; collective action. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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