The Implication of Groups with Direct Influences on Political Decision-Making: It’s a Chance to Stoke up Governments’ Role?

Antonio García Lorenzo () and A. Javier Prado-Dominguez
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Antonio García Lorenzo: Universidad de A Coruña

Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, 2006, vol. 176, issue 1, 73-85

Abstract: In this work we present a model basis on Bernheim-Whinston model, which considers that political decisions are the result of various interactions between groups with direct influence (GDI) on political decision making. According to our approach, this model stokes up government role which consists in to strengthen not only the competitiveness amongst lobbies which occurs in an flawed market and non-market and political framework, but also in the creation of counterweight power among the aforementioned lobbies, therefore a explicit regulation is required to give an efficient response to rapid politician market changes.

Keywords: flawed state; political decision-making; groups with direct influence (GDI); competitiveness; counterweight powers; and explicit regulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H10 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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