Competencia e incentivos a la cooperación en la interacción de grupos de interés que pretenden aumentar su influencia política directa: ¿cuál es la importancia de la presión política?

A. Javier Prado-Dominguez and Antonio García Lorenzo ()
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Antonio García Lorenzo: Universidad de A Coruña

Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, 2010, vol. 192, issue 1, 105-125

Abstract: This study is about the interactions between GDI and government under political pressure, in a context with an agency relationship and the existence of relevant information. In particular, interactions are studied when the agency relationship is with symmetric information and it is build a research model of the GDI-government interactions in a context with an agency relationship and asymmetric information, where groups can operate in a competitive or cooperative manner. The model highlights that government expectations of utility are higher when the GDI works together, and the benefit when the GDI makes pressure in an independent way is limited to the reserve. Cooperation establishes a type of relations based on credibility that benefit to the government and the GIDI, and this will help to strengthen those links

Keywords: Groups with Direct Influence (GDI); Political Pressure; Lobby (-ing); Agency Relationship; Symmetric and Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D82 H10 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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