Pardon Does not Forgive Democracy: Econometrical Analysis of Pardons in Spain

Juan Jiménez González and José Abreu ()
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José Abreu: Universidad Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, 2016, vol. 216, issue 1, 81-102

Abstract: The pardon is a legal, although controversial, instrument with a long history that persists in many different judicial systems across the world. The juridical literature often considers it to be a perversion in the separation of powers within the State, and the motivations behind it are always under scrutiny. In this paper we seek to establish whether there are specific factors that affect and determine pardons. Using a database of all pardons granted in Spain between 1995 and 2013, including our own elaborated individual data, the econometrical estimations produce the following conclusions: firstly, Spain’s right-wing political party processes pardons faster than that of the left; secondly, and due to public concern, pardons are less frequent near elections; and thirdly, the higher the fine, the faster the pardon. These results show that the pardon is used in a discretionary way and in most cases greatly distorts the separation of powers that should provide the basis of any healthy democratic system.

Keywords: Pardons; democracy; politics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 P48 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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