The Effect of Decentralisation on Access to Sanitation and Water Services: An Empirical Test using International Data

Kayode Taiwo

Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, 2024, vol. 249, issue 2, 157-180

Abstract: Decentralisation promises efficiency gains and improved access to public goods and services, especially at the local level. Under a decentralised governance arrangement, regional and environmental peculiarities are considered prominently in delivering public goods and services. Given the impact of the environment in influencing sanitation and water services, particularly water provision, this study examines the effect of decentralisation, as measured by revenue share and expenditure share, on access to improved sanitation facilities and drinkable water. Exploiting the variation in the access to sanitation facilities and drinking water using the Hausman-Taylor estimator, this study suggests a positive impact of decentralisation on the access to sanitation and drinkable water.

Keywords: Decentralisation; Subnational government; Sanitation; Water; Panel data. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H77 O18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: The effect of decentralisation on access to sanitation and water services: An empirical test using international data (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2024:v:249:i:2:p:157-180

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