WHY HIGHER LEVELS OF AUDITOR-PROVIDED TAX SERVICES LOWER THE LIKELIHOOD OF RESTATEMENTS

Kevin A. Diehl

Accounting & Taxation, 2012, vol. 4, issue 2, 13-30

Abstract: Kinney et al. (2004) ask in the Journal of Accounting Research: Why do higher levels of auditor-provided tax services lower the chances of restatements? In resolving this question, this paper investigates the relationship between auditor-provided tax services and restatements with proxies to represent the motivations of the audit committee and chief financial officers. Because Sarbanes-Oxley requires audit committee preapproval for these tax services, the necessity for including these variables is obvious. Logistic regression of seven specifications show that higher levels of auditor-provided tax services, financial experts, and long-term compensation are inversely and statistically significantly related to all restatements and (more strongly) to tax-influential restatements. The cash effective tax rate directly and statistically significantly relates to those specifications, showing that just increasing spending on these tax services cannot signal high-quality financial reporting in the absence of effective utilization.

Keywords: restatements; audit committees; tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.theibfr2.com/RePEc/ibf/acttax/at-v4n2-2012/AT-V4N2-2012-2.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibf:acttax:v:4:y:2012:i:2:p:13-30

Access Statistics for this article

Accounting & Taxation is currently edited by Terrance Jalbert

More articles in Accounting & Taxation from The Institute for Business and Finance Research
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mercedes Jalbert ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).