ENABLING TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE COMPLIANCE VIA PRINCIPAL-AGENT INCENTIVE MECHANISMS

Andrew Manikas and Michael Godfrey

Global Journal of Business Research, 2011, vol. 5, issue 2, 105-114

Abstract: A corporation that wants to fully embrace sustainability must address all three pillars of the triple bottom line. Among profit, planet, and people, it is this last category that is hardest to measure directly. When a company has remote locations and cannot directly observe effort, the compliance must be inferred from other metrics. We introduce a game-theoretic model to influence plant compliance to corporate goals.

Keywords: Sustainability; Triple-Bottom-Line; Principal-Agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 C61 M10 O21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.theibfr2.com/RePEc/ibf/gjbres/gjbr-v5n2-2011/GJBR-V5N2-2011-10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibf:gjbres:v:5:y:2011:i:2:p:105-114

Access Statistics for this article

Global Journal of Business Research is currently edited by Terrance Jalbert

More articles in Global Journal of Business Research from The Institute for Business and Finance Research
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mercedes Jalbert ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).