EFFECTS OF INSIDER SHAREHOLDING ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN

Te-Kuang Chou

Global Journal of Business Research, 2013, vol. 7, issue 3, 47-58

Abstract: Ownership structure is one of the key determinants constituting internal corporate governance, which is especially crucial in emerging markets. This study explores the effects of insider shareholding, an obvious characteristic of ownership structure, on corporate governance. The empirical results demonstrate partial support for the convergence-of-interests argument. This means that a higher insider shareholding structure tends to benefit corporate governance. However, the results also show possible moderating effects from different industrial settings; further studies are needed to deepen the understanding of these effects. Policy implications are provided for legislation and investing in emerging markets.

Keywords: corporate governance; ownership structure; insider shareholding; agency theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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