INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN ELECTRONIC COMPANIES

Chiaju Kuo, Yung-Yu Lai, Shaio Yan Huang and Chung-Jen Fu

The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, 2011, vol. 5, issue 4, 57-74

Abstract: This study’s focuses on the effects of directors and employee stock bonus plans on electronic companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation. In addition, the paper examines the appropriate internal corporate governance mechanisms for firms. The evidence shows firms with different scale measured by paid-in capital, need different corporate governance mechanisms. That is, raising directors’ ownership may enhance corporate governance mechanisms for small firms. Appointing independent directors voluntarily may enhance corporate governance mechanisms for middle size firms. Furthermore, large firms may enhance corporate governance mechanisms by raising all directors’ ownership, appointing independent directors voluntarily, or decreasing the proportion of managers serving concurrently as directors. Independent directors appear to have more effects on middle size and large firms.

Keywords: corporate governance; independent directors; independent supervisors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 G35 M48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibf:ijbfre:v:5:y:2011:i:4:p:57-74

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