DETERMINANTS OF BANK BOARD STRUCTURE IN GHANA
Michael Adusei
The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, 2012, vol. 6, issue 1, 15-23
Abstract:
The paper investigates the determinants of bank board structure in Ghana and finds that the Scope of Operations Hypothesis could explain the variation in board size but not board independence. On the other hand, the Board Monitoring Hypothesis could only explain the variation in board independence but not board size. The study also finds that cost-income ratio, foreign majority ownership structure and Ghana Stock Exchange listing status are positively and significantly associated with large bank board size. The paper, therefore, argues that as a bank grows in Ghana the size of its board of directors is likely to increase. However, the increase is likely to result in inefficiency of the bank. Furthermore, the study has evidence to conclude that banks with foreign majority ownership structure are not likely to appoint more independent directors.
Keywords: Board structure; board size; board independence; Scope of Operations Hypothesis; Board Monitoring Hypothesis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G20 G21 G30 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibf:ijbfre:v:6:y:2012:i:1:p:15-23
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