A Study of a Venture Company’s Control Rights Allocation Model

Hiromi Sakakibara, Shuichi Ishida, Takashi Natori and Nobuaki Minato

Asian Social Science, 2018, vol. 14, issue 1, 160

Abstract: This paper proposes an allocation model of control rights between entrepreneurs and investors to properly manage venture companies. The basic concept of this model involves reflecting the company’s future market value in its control rights to entrepreneurs as an incentive, while securing investors’ minimum monetary requirements. Previous studies reveal that entrepreneurs’ control rights gradually dilute as the monetary requirement increases in multi-staged financing; therefore, it is necessary to establish a fundamental rule for control rights allocations in initial contracts. This model also has the capability to allocate cash flow rights, and the potential capability to justify its premium.

Date: 2018
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