Risk, Preference, Capital Structure and Incentives

Zhongwei Wu

International Business Research, 2018, vol. 11, issue 7, 20-34

Abstract: Using the surplus theory of the firm, we examine capital and labor as inputs of a surplus generating firm, and study the capital structure of the firm. We derive two equilibrium models on: (a) the capital structure and ownership of the firm and (b) alternative incentive compensation structures. Within the framework of the firm as a cooperative surplus generating enterprise, we introduce the concepts of risk, preference and resource constraints, to provide a framework for analyzing more sophisticated methods of dividing the risks and rewards of the firm’s surplus.

Keywords: firm; risk; preference; capital structure; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibn:ibrjnl:v:11:y:2018:i:7:p:20-34

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