Feedback Nash Equilibrium of N Agents Fishery Problem

Letian Jiao and Haitao Chen

International Business Research, 2021, vol. 14, issue 5, 78

Abstract: This paper is built on the fundamental of Jorgensen and Sorge considering a differential game about fishery problem. In reality, the exploiters can be many because of the non-excludability of common resource. Thus, we expand the former two players model to N players model and we find more different equilibriums in N players scenario. Through this, we want to find some guidance for the changing of common resource stock. Further to control overexploitation.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ibr/article/download/0/0/45169/47876 (application/pdf)
http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ibr/article/view/0/45169 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibn:ibrjnl:v:14:y:2021:i:5:p:78

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Business Research from Canadian Center of Science and Education Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Canadian Center of Science and Education ().