The Impact of Power Structures on Supply Chain Enterprises with Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions

Fan Dandan and Xu Qi

International Journal of Business and Management, 2018, vol. 13, issue 8, 246

Abstract: This paper focuses on analyzing the impact of power structures of supply chain enterprises on their carbon emission reduction decisions. First, three game models (Nash, Manufacturer Stackelberg and Retailer Stackelberg) are constructed according to members’ different bargaining power, respectively. Then, the optimal carbon emission reduction decisions and profits of supply chain enterprises in different game models are solved and compared. The research results show that supply chain enterprises have the lowest carbon emission reduction rate in Nash game, and their corresponding profits are the least. As for Stackelberg game, the carbon emission reduction rate as a leader is greater than that as a follower, but the profit as a leader is less than that as a follower. The total profit of the entire supply chain system in Manufacturer Stackelberg model is always greater than that in Retailer Stackelberg model.

Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijbm/article/download/74102/42210 (application/pdf)
http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijbm/article/view/74102 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibn:ijbmjn:v:13:y:2018:i:8:p:246

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Business and Management from Canadian Center of Science and Education Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Canadian Center of Science and Education (ijbm@ccsenet.org).