How Does Corporate Governance Influence Hedging Strategy? An Empirical Study

Lilia Rekik and Asmaa Alaoui Taib

International Journal of Economics and Finance, 2018, vol. 10, issue 12, 115

Abstract: This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance on the choice of hedging instruments. Using a panel data of 370 firm-year observations from gold mining industry, we found that boards with a strong presence of institutional investors as directors were more likely to defend shareholders’ interests in decisions on how to hedge firm exposure. Results also indicated that firms whose managers had risk incentives induced by stock options were more likely to use insurance strategies (put options), while CEO equity ownership was positively correlated with linear hedging (forwards, spot-deferred contracts, and gold loans).

Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijef/article/download/0/0/37507/37826 (application/pdf)
http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijef/article/view/0/37507 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibn:ijefaa:v:10:y:2018:i:12:p:115

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in International Journal of Economics and Finance from Canadian Center of Science and Education Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Canadian Center of Science and Education ().