Executive Incentives and Maximization of the Value of Stakeholders ¡ª¡ªRegulating Effects Based on the Independent Director

Qitong Yu, Zili Lin and Chang Deng

International Journal of Economics and Finance, 2018, vol. 10, issue 9, 46

Abstract: Salary incentives mechanism is the main approach used by corporations to solve the agency issues between the management and shareholders. From the perspective of maintaining the maximum of stakeholders¡¯ value, this paper, using the data of A-share listed companies between 2012 and 2016, examines the effectiveness of cash compensation and equity-based incentives. Whether the relationship between the two can be regulated by the introduction of the independent director is further discussed. The empirical results indicate that cash compensation effectively increase the executive¡¯s concern about the interests of stakeholders, while equity-based incentives do just the opposite. In addition, regardless of the proportion of independent director, its regulating effects on the relationship between the two above is negative, causing an adverse effect on the executive¡¯s corporate governance in the light of maximization of the value of stakeholders.

Date: 2018
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