Asymmetric Information and Islamic Financial Contracts

Abdelhafid Benamraoui and Yousef Alwardat

International Journal of Economics and Finance, 2019, vol. 11, issue 1, 96-108

Abstract: This research paper aims to examine the relevance of asymmetric information to the two main financial contracts used by Islamic banks or conventional banks with Islamic windows, mudaraba and musharaka. We use theoretical proofs to explain how asymmetric information affects mudaraba and musharaka contract in terms of bank cost and yield and how to account for the adverse selection and moral hazard costs when calculating bank net profit or loss. We also provide suggestions supported by key modern theories including signalling, comparative advantage and incentives to resolve asymmetric information problems in the Islamic financial contracts. The research paper shows that asymmetric information is relevant to both mudaraba and musharaka contracts and directly affects Islamic banks and conventional banks with Islamic windows cost and yield. The paper also reveals that signalling and incentives are effective tools to deal with asymmetric information in Islamic financial contracts. Finally, the paper shows that Islamic finance providers need to opt for more secure financing, particularly with small borrowers.

Keywords: intellectual capital; VAIC?; agency theory; corporate governance mechanisms; Malaysia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibn:ijefaa:v:11:y:2019:i:1:p:96-108

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