Population Monotonicity in Public Good Economies with Single Dipped Preferences

Ipek Gursel Tapki

International Journal of Economics and Finance, 2016, vol. 8, issue 4, 80-83

Abstract: We study public good economies with variable population. We consider the problem of locating a single public good along a segment when agents have single dipped preferences. We analyze population monotonicity along with the standard properties Pareto efficiency, continuity and no-veto power. We show that there is no rule satisfying these properties together.

Keywords: single-dipped preferences; population monotonity; variable population (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibn:ijefaa:v:8:y:2016:i:4:p:80-83

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