The Evolution of Citizen Participation and Regulatory Success

Ken-Ichi Akao and Geumsoo Kim

International Journal of Economics and Finance, 2017, vol. 9, issue 6, 179-187

Abstract: In an evolutionary game setting we have shown that either perfect compliance or perfect non-compliance with a regulation can evolve as an asymptotically stable state. However, this depends critically on the size of a defector¡¯s additional payoff when there is no private monitoring to a cooperator¡¯s payoff, relative to his expected fine from an enforcer¡¯s monitoring. As an enforcer¡¯s willingness to monitor voluntarily gets affected by their relative share of the population to the defectors¡¯, the society could be stuck in the neighborhood of the initial state if many defectors already exist and a little larger than enforcers, even though the regulatory agency has a strong policy in its enforcement.

Keywords: citizen participation; evolutionary game; monitoring; regulation; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ibn:ijefaa:v:9:y:2017:i:6:p:179-187

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