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Majority Voting – A Critique Preferential Decision-Making – An Alternative

Peter Emerson

Journal of Politics and Law, 2024, vol. 17, issue 1, 47

Abstract: The basis of western democracy is the almost universal belief that controversies shall be resolved by the will of a majority. And quite right too. Unfortunately, this leads many to take decisions by a majority vote, with proposed amendments and then the motion itself all approved or rejected in simple yes-or-no ballots. Other more accurate voting systems have long since been devised, and yet binary voting prevails, not only in democracies, but also in theocracies and autocracies; it is ubiquitous, in politics, business and law. Accordingly, this article analyses its weaknesses, discusses its origins, relates a little history, and refers to some of its worst consequences. It then goes on to describe a non-majoritarian methodology, to compare majority voting to other decision-making voting procedures, and finally to talk of a world where the words ‘majority’, ‘minority’ and ‘veto’ may fade from the political lexicon.

Date: 2024
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