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The Stable Set and Weak Stable Set For -person Repeated Fuzzy Cooperative Games

Zuofeng Gao, Suting Zhang, Hongxin Bai, Chunyan Han and Sheng Zhao

Modern Applied Science, 2008, vol. 2, issue 2, 97

Abstract: In this paper,based on the fuzzy games,we define the imputation sequences of the -person repeated games,and the domination,weak domination for the imputation sequences.Further,based on this theory,we define the core ,the weak core,the stable set,and the weak stable set of the -person repeated fuzzy cooperative games.At last,some properties of the stable set and the weak stable set are given.

Date: 2008
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